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"To make the future and to establish things for all time is not our concern. All the more surely what we now have to do is the uncompromising critical evaluation of all that exists, uncompromising in the sense that our criticism fears neither its own results nor the conflict with the powers that be."

KARL MARX, 1843.

IDEOLOGIES

The word "ideologie," coined about 1797, to mean simply "the science of ideas," was given a political application when Napoleon referred contemptuously to political idealists and reformers as "ideologues," and in this sense was taken over and expanded by Marx. But, although largely because of Marx, "ideology" and "ideological" are fashionable political words to-day, their current use ignores what was definite and distinctive in Marx's theory of ideologies. At the same time this theory has been largely neglected by commentators on Marxism.[1] It is, therefore, worth recalling Marx's theory and showing how a defensible, general view of ideologies emerges from a critical study of it.

I.

For Marx ideologies arise in the first place in his account of the ruling ideas of each age as being an expression of the material conditions of the ruling class. By extension each class is said to have its appropriate ideology, so that the class struggle is accompanied by a corresponding battle of ideologies. In a well-known passage Marx says: "The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness."[2] This is the ground for such statements on ideology as the following: "If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside down as in a **camera obscura**, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process." "Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence."[3]

So far ideologies, as ideas or sets of ideas dependent on material economic conditions, are merely adjuncts to Marx's theory of historical materialism. (This theory will not be discussed here; it can simply be noted in line with familiar criticism that historical materialism, taken literally, leads to the logical and causal errors of monism, and wrongly tries to reduce to economic factors other equally real factors, such as political, administrative and scientific activities.) If this were all that Marx meant, nothing additional would be conveyed by speaking of "ideologies" instead of "ideas." But what is, according to Marx, distinctive about an ideology, what makes it more than merely a dependent reflection of economic conditions, is that it is essentially an illusory or distorted idea, belief, theory or philosophy, an idea which masquerades as something other than it is. Even when Marx talks in this way, however, we have to distinguish what is just an echo of his historical materialism from what is not. It is commonly not noticed that there is an ambiguity in Marx's references to ideologies as illusions or as disguising their real content. An idea or belief may be illusory or distorted because it involves the **general** error (according to Marx) of denying historical materialism; i.e., of being taken to be as real as or to have a causal role independent of economic forces (cf. Engels' statement that an ideology is "occupation with thoughts as with independent entities, developing independently and subject only to their own laws"[4]). But when Marx refers, for instance, to the aristocratic concepts of honour and loyalty and the bourgeois concepts of freedom and equality as examples of class ideology, he is indicating that ideologies, unlike some other ideas, are distorted or subject to illusions in a specific way; they appear to state or advocate certain specific things, when what they are really doing is advocating certain other specific things. It is this kind of illusion that "The German Ideology" emphasises. ". . . active, conceptive ideologists, who make the perfecting of the illusion of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood." "Each new class which puts itself in the place of the one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, put in an ideal form." "Whilst in ordinary life every shopkeeper is very well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he really is, our historians have not yet won even this trivial insight. They take every epoch at its word and believe that everything it says and imagines about itself is true."

Emphasis has to be placed on this distinction between "ideas" and "ideologies" in order to deal with ambiguities that arise in Marxism about the status of science and the status of proletarian ideas. The two questions come together because of the claim that Marxism itself as "scientific socialism" is both a science and the expression of proletarian interests and policies.

All science is sometimes implied by Marxists to be ideology, as when they insist on their theory of relative truth. According to this, no view, including the Marxist view itself, has objective or absolute truth; each view (as "superstructure") is relative to the social conditions prevailing at the time it is presented. There is some dispute about whether Marx at any time meant this to apply to non-social views and hence to natural science: Engels' peculiar observations about the dialectics of nature certainly imply that there is bourgeois physics, bourgeois mathematics, and so on, but it has been argued (e.g., by Sidney Hook) that this was a flight of fancy of Engels but not of Marx. Leaving this aside, if we confine ourselves to social science, on the simple superstructure and relative truth view, it would follow that any social theory or science is a class one, so that there would be no distinction in respect of truth between Marxism and other social views; all would be relative and forms of ideology. Despite this, however, Marx spent a good deal of time showing the unscientific or false character of bourgeois views (e.g., economic views) and he was led to make the often-quoted statement: "With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations, a distinc-

(1) A brief but illuminating account is found in Max Eastman's "Marx, Lenin, and the Science of Revolution," repeated in his "Marxism, Is It Science?" A more recent, more detailed account is given in H. B. Acton's "The Illusion of the Epoch," which is scholarly but shows less insight into social realities.

(2) "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy," Preface.

(3) Marx and Engels: "The German Ideology."

(4) "L. Feuerbach," Part IV.

tion should always be made between the material transformations of the economic conditions of production, which can be **determined with the precision of natural science,** and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophical—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out."[5] The clear implication here that the study of social conditions (as well as natural science) can be precise and correct goes against the simple, ideas = superstructure, view; it is implied that though the study of social conditions will itself have social conditions, unlike ideology, it need not be distorted by those conditions and can discover genuine or objective truths.

The same qualification of the superstructure model led Marx to treat the ideas or views of the working class as unco-ordinate with those of the other classes. This contrast he and Engels marked by reserving "ideology" as a derogatory label for the views of the other classes. But we need to notice that in this they differ from Lenin and later Communists, who speak freely of the "proletarian ideology." For example, Lenin (in emphasising the need for a proletarian vanguard) said: "They fail to understand that an ideologist is worthy of that name only when he marches **ahead** of the spontaneous movement," and thus used "proletarian ideologists" in a favourable sense; while in saying: "In a society torn by class contradictions there can be no extra-class or super-class ideology," he also denied what is precisely a key feature of ideologies according to Marx —to purport to speak in the name of all classes. No doubt this is partly just a terminological difference, but even so, Marx's use has more content and is the more defensible, for the use of "ideology" by Lenin and his successors (as well as by our own newspapers and political spokesmen) deprives the word of a specific use by obscuring altogether Marx's contrast between ideological and non-ideological expressions of social views and policies.

II.

Let us, then, insist with Marx on a distinction between ideology and non-ideology. We may, however, still criticise his treatment of proletarian ideas and policies as different in nature from those of the other classes. What is offered as a straightforward statement of the difference, that the ideas of the working class are superstructure which **accurately** reflect the coming economic structure of society, whereas the ideas of the bourgeoisie are necessarily distorted and ideological reflections, proves difficult to disentangle from the Hegelian metaphysics that remains in Marxism. The distinction between accurate and distorted reflections, along with the associated distinctions between real and illusory and between conscious and unconscious interests or aims, is closely connected with Marx's theory of the "contradictions of capitalism" and of the **inevitability** of socialism. The view is that since the capitalist class is by nature incompatible with impending economic developments, it can have only an illusory consciousness of society, whereas the proletariat by its coming to consciousness in an undistorted way (or even: by being that through which society is coming to consciousness of itself) is, in fact, accelerating changes that are in its own interests. An example of this type of argument is given by the concept of self-alienation which Marx took over from Hegel. Arguing that private property and the proletariat are contradictory opposites, Marx says: "The propertied class and the class of the proletariat present the same human self-alienation. But the former finds in this self-alienation its confirmation and its good, **its own power:** it has in it a **semblance** of human existence. The class of the proletariat feels annihilated in its self-alienation; it sees in it its own powerlessness and the reality of an inhuman existence." He goes on to argue that the self-alienation of the proletariat will of necessity be overcome. "Private property drives itself in its economic movement towards its own dissolution. only, however, through a development which does not depend on it, of which it is unconscious and which takes place against its will, through the very nature of things; only inasmuch as it produces the proletariat **as** proletariat, that misery conscious of its spiritual and physical misery, that dehumanisation conscious of its dehumanisation and, therefore, self-abolishing. The proletariat executes the sentence that private property pronounced on itself by begetting the proletariat."[6] Without taking up finer questions such as whether concepts like self-alienation and self-consciousness have any factual content when applied to classes, it is clear that the distinctions made depend on two assumptions: (i) that society is **of necessity** changing its economic structure to socialism, and (ii) that the impending structure is the criterion for the reality or unreality of the outlook of a class. But these assumptions stand only if we accept the literal theory of the contradictions of capitalism and thereby make the category mistake of believing that there can be **logical** contradictions between **things.** Suppose instead we interpret this theory as referring to a **social** conflict between equally **real** forces. It then follows, of course, that if the proletariat wins the bourgeoisie will suffer and vice versa, but there is nothing in this to show that the one class is more, or less, alienated from itself, or subject to illusions about its "real interests," than the other.

If we treat the Marxist view, not as a system of necessary truths, but as an empirical account of social situations, we may reformulate Marx's distinction between the outlook of the proletariat and those of the other classes as follows: Ideology has been an essential accompaniment of all previous ruling and revolutionary classes. In the case of slave-owners, feudalists and the bourgeoisie, their professed social and political policies, their legal and ethical theories, philosophies and religions, have all been ideological disguises for social demands in the interests of their class. Without ideology the bourgeoisie, for instance, could not have enlisted sufficient support to overthrow the feudal system or to remain in power. But the working class can succeed in its revolutionary struggle with the ruling capitalist class **without** disguising its real aims and interests by ideology. It can do this because (perhaps) the existence of so many more proletarians obviates the aid of other classes in obtaining power, and because the economy it aims at will contain no classes to be exploited and so pacified by ideology.

This picture of an end to ideology, however, ignores historical realities. Apart from criticisms of the notion

(5) "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy," Preface; my emphasis.

(6) Marx and Engels, "The Holy Family."

of the classless society, which is itself a piece of consolatory ideology, the prediction that an undivided proletariat will rationally emancipate itself, forgets that the proletariat will require leaders or emancipators who have, or when they capture State power will come to have, special interests and an accompanying ideology of their own. The examples available since Marx's time of successful revolutions made in the name of the proletariat show that there has been an ample, continued occurrence of ideology. Within Communist countries the differentiation of groups according to the power, status and economic advantage they possess has been accompanied (as in persisting capitalist countries) by ideological beliefs which camouflage the favours received by ruling groups at the expense of those who continue to be ruled. That this is an outcome that could have been anticipated is quite clearly indicated in the following **unqualified** statement by Marx of what happens when one ruling class displaces another:

> "Each new class which puts itself in the place of the one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, put in an ideal form; it will give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones. The class making a revolution appears from the very start, merely because it is opposed to a **class,** not as a class but as the representative of the whole of society; it appears as the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class. It can do this because, to start with, its interest really is more connected with the common interest of all other non-ruling classes, because under the pressure of conditions its interest has not yet been able to develop as the particular interest of a particular class. Its victory, therefore, benefits also many individuals of the other classes who are not winning a dominant position, but only in so far as it now puts these individuals in a position to raise themselves into the ruling class. When the French bourgeoisie overthrew the power of the aristocracy, it thereby made it possible for many proletarians to raise themselves above the proletariat, but only in so far as they became Bourgeois." ("The German Ideology.")

But Marx forgot all this when he came to talk about the proletarian revolution, with the ironical result that his own writings have provided the vocabulary and concepts for the ideology of a new ruling class of managers and State officials. For the same reason, Lenin was, after all, right, but unwittingly, when he spoke of the "proletarian **ideology.**"

III.

In reconstructing Marx's theory we need first to meet a charge that is sometimes made against the entire account of ideologies, viz., that it is really an elaborate **argumentum ad hominem,** since it replaces considered discussion of views and policies by an attack on motives. H. B. Acton, for instance, cautiously suggests this when he says: "The **unmasking** of ideologies, in the sense of showing the class interests that prompt them, is only in place when the belief that is thus unmasked has already been shown to be false. Thus, quite apart from questions of good manners that may differ from place to place and time to time, no controversialist is entitled to refer to his opponent's motives unless the arguments that his opponent has used have been shown by argument to be untenable." This is a salutory comment on the logic of Marxists themselves, many of whom regularly evade issues by confusing appeals to motives or class origins with criticisms of beliefs. Nevertheless, it is easy enough to distinguish logical criticism from social theory, and we have to stress what Acton does not stress, that as an independent contribution to social theory the study of ideologies **is** precisely the study of the motives, or rather the social reasons, for the presentation of certain views. Not all studies of the **man** are **argumenta ad hominem**; we may criticise beliefs, but we may also independently study the motives men have for their beliefs (Acton obscures this and appears to think our main or only interest is in argument when he speaks of our being **entitled** to refer to motives only under special conditions). These are two distinct procedures, both of which are, in fact, employed when we class beliefs as "ideologies." On the one hand (though this has not been the aim of this paper), we can present philosophical criticisms of the beliefs themselves; to mention obvious candidates, it has often been argued by realistic thinkers that the key doctrines of religion, traditional ethics and political philosophy, along with those of dialectical materialism, are (apart from having various inconsistent formulations) taken at their face value, false or, more pointedly, logically absurd. On the other hand, as students of society we may study the social origins and functions of ideological beliefs and try to solve the problem of why they are so widespread and politically influential.

What we can disentangle from Marx's account of class beliefs, particularly of bourgeois beliefs, is a theory of ideology which can be generalised to take in far more than "class" beliefs. For it is to be stressed that Marx's rigid class categories (limited as they are to economic divisions) do not do justice to the variety of social conflicts, even if a new class of bureaucrats and managers is added to them. There are important variations amongst "the bourgeoisie" and "the working class," as well as amongst "bureaucrats," or, what comes to the same thing, there are in society many groups and organisations (along with different groups, different and competing forms of activity, within these) which cut across the class categories. As a result, we have to speak guardedly of class ideologies and recognise the much more ramified role of ideology in society. We have to recognise that as well as such broad ideologies as national, class and religious ideologies, there are many other sets of beliefs whose content and social function is ideological. There is, for example, a distinctive trade union ideology, a distinctive academic ideology; industrial experts, lawyers and army officers, for that matter, real estate agents and sporting officials, usually have a special ideology of their own; and, moreover, in the case of all of these, as well as **the** ideology, i.e., the typical or prevailing one, there may also be competing or minority ideologies. There are, of course, differences in the conceptual richness or poverty of these ideologies; and the more special ideologies are usually derivatives in the sense that their main concepts are usually borrowed from well-established ideologies, but they are separate ideologies because (to anticipate following discussion) what it is that they distort or rationalise depends on the particular type of social organisation with which they are connected. (Naturally, these various ideologies cannot be discussed or even illustrated in the present brief paper; doing so is really what the major part of libertarian day-to-day criticism consists in.)

The views or beliefs Marx labelled "bourgeois ideology" and all other ideological views have this in

THE L.W.W. IN AUSTRALIA

"The Bosses Own the Earth. You Only Own Your Labour Power. Organise to Control It and the Earth is Yours. Wage Slaves, Wear Your Wooden Shoes."

The Industrial Workers of the World are remembered for their showing in America; their deeds were part of the potent American legend written by Dos Passos and others into the early years of this century. I.W.W. clubs appeared after 1907 in Australian industrial towns; from then until their eclipse at the close of the First World War, the wobblies were both the spearhead and bane of the trade union movement. The events of that decade have been conveniently played down since by most historians, of the right and left.

The effective labour movement in Australia declined with the growth of a political party to represent the claims of labour in legislative peace and quiet. If you accept this viewpoint, the work of the I.W.W. is seen then as a last attempt by certain of the unions to organise themselves industrially and dynamically to destroy capitalism, before too many of the champions of labour were diverted into parliamentary debate. The I.W.W. had no time for politicians, particularly labour politicians:

"You fat-headed toilers did not imagine when you sent your reps. to Parliament, that they slept on the floor of the House, while your problems were being discussed.

"Yesterday's Herald says so, anyhow, and also tells you, unblushingly, that £12 a week is not enough to buy your politicians a 'doss.'

"They haven't the price to buy a decent 'flop' outside, and so it seems your legislators, on Wednesday night, in YOUR Federal Parliament, indulged in a free-for-all fight as to which of YOUR representatives possessed this pillow or that blanket.

"Why don't you buy them all blankets and pillows, r. Political Actionist? Let 'em sleep like you are doing."

I.W.W. precepts were formulated in America, and adopted without innovation by the Australian locals. The I.W.W. preamble, drawn up in Chicago, stated simply the existence of the class struggle, and what the workers should do about it. "These conditions can be changed and the interest of the working class upheld only by an organisation framed in such a way that all its members in any one industry, or in all industries, cease work whenever a strike or lockout is on in any department thereof, thus making an injury to one an injury to all." After parliamentarism, the next feature of the established labour movement which the I.W.W. attacked was the trade unions themselves. Even those unions which attempted to organise more widely than on a craft or single shop basis, such as the Australian Labour Federation, represented "little more than organised scabbery." Different trade unions, responsible in effect to no one but themselves, would pursue their varying policies, and as often as not, clash with each other. The I.W.W. ideal—ideal it always remained—was the One Big Union of all the working class, with delegates at the top level from the six broad departments of industry—Agricultural, Mining, Transport and Communications, Manufacturing and General Production, Construction, and Public Service—and reaching down in each department through a departmental committee, national industrial unions, and local industrial unions with shop branches perhaps. District councils would cross-cut this system to unite the workers of all departments in the same district. So a single streamlined union would have as its bargaining weapon, for large-scale or local manoeuvres, the whole of the world's labour power.

In Australia, industry and trade unionism grew up at an uneven pace together. In the first part of the 19th century, the main job was in construction and public works, and it was various unions connected with the building trade that had the first successful strikes and secured the 8-Hour Day for themselves in 1856, before anywhere else in the world. There was no machinery for distributing this gain among other workers; the miners continued to battle for it throughout the century. Up till 1890 was a time of increasing prosperity, industry came on at a great rate, and so did the wool clip; so did the trade unions. In the two main fields of labour, the shearing-shed and the mine, where demands were not granted as readily as to skilled men like the builders, there appeared two formidable unions, the Amalgamated Miners' Association (1872) and the Amalgamated Shearers' Union (1886), whose membership came to include workers connected in a variety of ways with coal and silver-lead mining and the pastoral industry as a whole. These unions were precursors of the I.W.W. They were able to stand up to employers; a miner had to have an A.M.A. badge to get work in Broken Hill, and the 8-hour day became widespread. In self-defence, the employers formed their own unions, but these weren't of much avail in the '80s.

About 1890 the boom came to an end, and the employers could no longer accommodate the demands of the labour movement. Union militancy was high, and for the next four years, under worsening economic conditions, Labour and Capital engaged in a struggle, in the course of which the A.M.A. was dispersed on the Broken Hill field, and the resistance of the Queensland shearers finally broken down. The Labour Party was formed during this period, and in 1901 the Arbitration Clause (Sec. 51 xxxv) was drafted into the new Commonwealth Constitution. This clause was favoured less by the Labour Party than by those employers who realised the usefulness of a federal authority to wield against the big interstate unions. The pattern of employer-worker combats for the next half-century was thus laid down.

This did not mean that the unions laid off striking and accepted the Arbitration Judge as intermediary, or that union and Labour Party policies have not clashed on many occasions since 1891. But alongside these two institutions, the party and the court, we now have a third which was not evident in early Australian labour history, the tame-cat union. Most unions have ceased to be militant in a country where working conditions are arranged, not in the workshop or the shed, but by legislation, or automatic wage adjustments fixed by the Court, or by a decision of the Court. The biggest single union of the Arbitration Era has been the Australian Workers' Union, successor to the A.S.U., which up to 1912 was confined to the pastoral industry and held its award under the Arbitration Act on this understanding; nevertheless, it began to swallow up other unions, and after a 1912 conference in Sydney became a loose amalgamation of craft unions, containing at the outset nine unions with a total membership of about 100,000. The A.W.U. purported to be an industrial

union, but this claim was held in contempt by the I.W.W., who pointed out that it was wedded firmly to the Arbitration Court and paid a great deal of its funds to the Labour Party. One of its leaders in South Australia said that the A.W.U. "was not out to interfere with the employer in his control of industry, but only to bring the 'bad' employer to the level of the 'good' employer." Some unions, such as the Meat Industry Union of Queensland, retained their autonomy within the A.W.U.

After 1901 trade began to pick up again, and the manufacturing industries in particular made great strides. At this stage, with the employers consolidating their newly-won vantage positions, I.W.W. ideas began to be mooted about the unions. The Sydney Labour Council refused to hear a lecture on Industrial Unionism in 1907, and the Executive of the Melbourne Trades Hall Council, while praising the I.W.W. in America, stated that conditions in Australia did not call for a similar organisation. In 1908 the trammies struck in Sydney, and I.W.W. precepts were well enough known at this time for the N.S.W. Labour Premier to lay the blame at their door; but there were no wobbly locals founded yet. The Broken Hill miners struck and their leaders were jailed. Next year the Newcastle miners held the biggest and best organised strike since the 'nineties. The waterside workers, led by Billy Hughes, were in on it. The miners petitioned to deal with their employers direct, but this was refused and Peter Bowling, who led the miners, decided on a general strike. At this the watersiders withdrew their support. Premier Wade rushed a Bill through the N.S.W. Parliament to amend the Industrial Disputes Act, to make strikes in connection with "necessary commodities" illegal and authorise the police to break into any house where a strike meeting was suspected. This was neither the first nor the last of such 'Coercion Acts' in Australia since 1894. The strike leaders were arrested and tried in the Industrial Court, which had no jury and from the rulings of which no appeals were allowed. Bowling and his fellow-leaders got 18 months apiece, and the Coal Strike collapsed. Two years after, the first I.W.W. local received its charter in Adelaide.

Attempts have been made to discover what are termed the national characteristics of Australians. Most of these theories make mention of the pioneering days of our history, the inland plains being opened up by the bushworkers wandering from squatter to squatter in search of a few days' work. From these are supposed to come the Australian virtues of tolerance, mateship and an easy-going distrust of bosses and (by extension) politicians and theorisers. If all this is true, then the nomadic shearers and backblocks men who were affiliated to the A.S.U. in the nineteenth century and joined the wobblies from 1911 on, should be recognised as the national prototype. The main conscripts to the I.W.W. came from these, and that other source of militant 19th century unionism, the miners. They were the true industrial proletariat of Australia; they didn't have any labour skills, all they had was their labour power.

By 1914 there were four I.W.W. locals, at Sydney, Adelaide, Broken Hill and Port Pirie. A split into extremists and political actionists in America had complicated the set-up a bit: the Sydney local was pro-De Leon at first, but with the influx in membership in 1913 it became extremist. The Adelaide local had been so from its inception. The greatest number of locals achieved was twelve, by 1916; there were others at Melbourne. Brisbane, Newcastle, the goldfields in Western Australia, Fremantle, Northern Queensland. Nothing like the ideal organisation was ever achieved—in Australia there were the locals and a General Executive Board at Sydney. The maximum membership was 2,000, and there was a newspaper, "Direct Action," published fortnightly at 330 Castlereagh Street, Sydney. In 1914 its circulation was 16,000.

As has been shown, the concept of a union embracing different types of occupation, was, in Australia, as old as unionism itself. Since 1890 this concept had been given a series of shakes, the last of which was the failure of the Brisbane General Strike in 1912 and the consequent break-up of the union which had existed only in Queensland, but bore the grandiose title, "Australian Labour Federation." We may suppose that the I.W.W. derived its initial impact, not just from its aims nor yet from the organisational scheme by which it hoped to secure them, but by the very simplicity and elegance with which it stated precepts which were red meat to many an old time unionist:

". . . The truth dawns on us that all social relations, all institutions, all political parties, are but a reflex of the economic system that prevails; that only a militant working-class, organised on sound lines, at the point of production, and carrying the fight on IN THE INDUSTRIES, can bring about emancipation from wage slavery."

And, ". . . Arbitration recognises the right of the employer to share in the product of labour, and the power of the Court to decide some conditions in an industry it does not understand.

"The I.W.W. holds that there is nothing to arbitrate about.

"The I.W.W. holds that any understanding between workers and employers is only an armistice, to be broken, when convenient, by either side. The Employing Class, as a whole, has always recognised and acted up to this. Only the working class have been foolish enough to keep to their side of contracts."

The I.W.W. emphasis on immediacy, on forthright action in the here-and-now, its justification of no-holds-barred combat with the employer, was its most novel and dynamic contribution to the Australian working-class movement:

"There are as many ways of applying sabotage as rules in the game of chess.

"Of course, the employers practise sabotage on a large scale, both on the workers and on each other. Adulterating foodstuffs, 'cornering' commodities; failing to tell a man, applying for a job, what the others are getting so as to start him at less; secretly paying a slogger a little extra in order to get him to speed the others up; 'editing,' or cooking up, news items so as to deceive the workers and the public generally; and in a thousand and one ways. The sailor, Nelson, committed sabotage when he didn't see that signal.

"Cement hardens too much, or too little, to suit the designs of a man manipulating the materials; paint peels off and changes colour if the mixer is careless; it is unlucky for a tyrannical boss to walk under a ladder; class conscious farm hands, or travelling rebels, would be more careless with matches when on the property of farmers who ride into town to shoot or bludgeon strikers.

"Every worker will know best how to practise sabotage in his own industry; he can get further information if required from 'Industrial Unionist' and syndicalist papers and literature, but the job is the best place to study. A little theory and practice combined, during working hours, will soon turn an intelligent man into an artist."

Some of the methods by which the wobblies proved their point are worth recounting. The Labour Gov-

workers. It would take a great deal of working out to describe the situation fully, but there are three factors I wish to point to.

First, something already mentioned, there exists a financial rivalry between different unions, and each one is prepared to use the authority of the Arbitration Court to improve their position without resorting to costly strikes. This rivalry is, of course, one reason that prevents them from acting in concert on other issues.

Secondly, the unions wish, in the main, to avoid outright clashes with the employers over control. Registration with the Arbitration Court, with its emphasis on rates of pay and hours of work, is a convenient way of steering clear of these clashes.

Behind this lies the third point, which I take to be the main one, that the unions have become conservative institutions, interested in control over their own members, in building up their finances and their property. Even though the idea of representation in the union is not as patent a fraud as representation in Parliament, there is a greater distinction between leaders and workers as time goes on. This process is helped in at least one particular way by arbitration, since this system, with its lengthy, legalised hearings, requires men with specialised knowledge and experience to cope with it.

I think one can say that the Arbitration Court, while upholding the employers' authority against the union and the workers, also supports the control of the union executives over their members. This is done partly through the court's demand that union officers see to it that their members work within the provisions of the award, and partly by the indirect ways I have tried to indicate.

The situation is such that the unions are in a dilemma. On the one hand there is the conservative tendency, the desire to avoid trouble and to cater for the moderate section of the workers, whose only demands are for more wages and continuity of work. These things fit in very well with the arbitration system. On the other hand, the unions are continually hampered and intimidated by the courts and are under pressure from the militants to defy the courts' authority outright. As one might expect, the militant section is losing out.

R. SMILDE.

"Utopian illusions may be a sweet consolation to some, just as religious mysticism is to others. But those of a stronger mould can 'bear all naked truth.' Champions of permanent protest, they will keep on fighting for justice, even though its full victory is not within the biological scheme. And the underdog, though he may never see the millenium, will get more out of this life if he keeps on struggling and mistrusting both his masters and his 'emancipators'."

—MAX NOMAD, "Apostles of Revolution."

REVIEW ARTICLES

FREUDISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS

Official biographies are usually tedious. Written by close personal friends with little or no literary training, they tend to whitewash the subject into uninteresting and often unbelievable purity, and to fill out their bulk with the minutiae of everyday life, with a lack of selection that would make any good novelist blush, and make even the most patient reader yawn.

The official biography of Sigmund Freud is no exception to the general rule, but this, the third volume of the trilogy,[1] is enlivened by venomous attacks on deviationists scattered through the accounts of Freud's annual holidays, the important people he met and with whom he corresponded, and the constant repetition of his dislike of birthday celebrations as the date comes around each year.

Like the previous two volumes, this book is divided into two almost equal parts, one dealing with the last 20 years of Freud's life, and the other with his writings over this period. The first chapter gives a resume of the important episodes in this period of Freud's life, the defections of Rank and Ferenczi and Freud's cancer, while the last chapter attempts an evaluation of Freud's effects in various cultural fields.

However, there is little connection between the two parts of the book and, because the writings are examined in separate chapters according to their subject, there is little connection between Freud's theories on different subjects at different times. Thus, in the chapter on Sociology (p. 361), Jones can remark how Freud once said that "the best access to the psychology of the ego might be through investigating the disorders of society," yet, in the chapter on Metapsychology (p. 293), he castigates Wilhelm Reich as a Communist who "announced that the death instinct was merely a by-product of the capitalistic system," and goes on himself to attack the "culminating theory of a Death Instinct," suggesting that it was a product of Freud's own pre-occupation with death (p. 300). The connections between the views of the earlier and later Freud, of Reich and of Jones, are never taken up.

In the first chapter, Jones quotes a letter from Freud to Ferenczi in April, 1919: "We are not suited to any kind of official existence, and we need independence in all respects. Perhaps we have reason to say: God protect us from our friends. So far we have dealt successfully with our enemies."

Then are retailed the sudden deaths of three such "enemies." One was the head of a firm which was to take over the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag on a commercial basis, after Jones had been appealing for funds on the grounds that the Verlag was an independent publishing house — "Fortunately for my peace of mind, however, the head of the other firm died at an appropriate moment, and the idea of amalgamation fell through." (p. 33). Another was an American publisher who had pirated a medley from Freud's writings—"The American pirate then sought an injunction to prevent the **(International Psychoanalytic) Journal** being admitted into the United States in revenge for a scathing expose I had written of the book; fate willed it, however, that he died a month later" (p. 51). An American analyst named Frink had "fallen in love with one of his patients, both of them being unhappily married, and proposed to secure a divorce and marry her. The other husband was furious and threatened to provoke a scandal that would ruin Frink . . . The end of it all was that the husband in question died at the critical moment." (p. 89).

After this rather ominous warning of the dangers of opposition to the psychoanalytic movement, Jones goes on to relate the details of Otto Rank's defection from the cause and later Ferenczi's. Both these men, on Jones' diagnosis, were clinically psychotic when they defected, and he draws parallels between their defections and that of Jung. He does not indicate that Jung was or is psychotic (Jung is one of the "enemies" who are still alive), but mentions, in passing, that he took over the presidency of the German Society for Psychotherapy after Kretschmer had resigned, following Reichsfuhrer Dr. M. H. Goring's explanation that all members were expected to make a thorough study of Hitler's **Mein Kampf,** which was to serve as a basis for their work. "Jung's chief function was to discriminate between Aryan psychology and Jewish psychology, and to emphasise the value of the former" (p. 199).

On the other end of the political scale, Wilhelm Reich is treated more leniently, perhaps in remembrance of the Russian sales of Freud's works (2,000 copies of the **Introductory Lectures** were sold in Moscow in one month in 1922). Even though Reich's paper on Masochism (Int. Z. f. Psa., 18, 1932, p. 303) is described as an "amalgamation of Marxism and psychoanalysis . . . which, according to Freud,[2] 'culminated in the nonsensical statement that what we have called the death instinct is a product of the capitalistic system'" (p. 177), this is dismissed as an "editorial question," and we are simply told that the Lucerne Congress (26th August, 1934) was the occasion on which Reich resigned from the International Psychoanalytic Association. "Freud had thought highly of him in his earlier days, but Reich's political fanaticism had led to both personal and scientific estrangement." (p. 204). Jones does not mention that it was also in 1934 that Reich was expelled from the German Communist Party, having been previously expelled from the Austrian Socialist Party in 1930.

Most of the remainder of the story of Freud's life from 1919 to his death is taken up with an account of the progress of his cancer through 33 operations in ghastly detail, and a 26-page appendix of surgical notes. Some of the incidental information, however, is interesting, such as the fact that Freud did not like Celine's **Journey to the End of the Night.** "I have no taste for this depicting of misery, for the description of the senselessness and emptiness of our present-day life, without any artistic or philosophical background. I demand something more from art than realism" (letter to Marie Bonaparte, 26th March, 1933, quoted on page 188—some of the letters are relegated to a 24-page appendix).

Less interesting is the list of titles which were con-

(1) Ernest Jones: **Sigmund Freud, Life and Work,** Vol. III, The Last Phase, 1919-1939, The Hogarth Press, London, 1957, pp. 536 — xv.

(2) For Reich's account, see Wilhelm Reich, **"Character Analysis"** (trans. T. P. Wolfe), 2nd edition, Orgone Institute Press, New York, 1945, pp. 208-210. A translation of the paper is given on pp. 210-247.

liamentary reform on such issues as censorship and civil liberties—what would Malatesta have thought of reforming the police? (cf. "The Secret Police and You," No. 2; "The Law of Dirty Books," No. 6). Anarchism for the U.L. is scarcely more than naive 19th century individualism. But the notion of 'the individual' as a social category is a conception so often and so conclusively criticised, that social theories which still manage to accept 'the individual' and deal in its terms cannot escape attachment to a variety of illusions implied by it. To hold that anarchism can only be supported along individualist lines is to adopt an interpretation of anarchism far less cogent and theoretically defensible than other interpretations. Individualist anarchism is an impoverished form of anarchism.

Even though the treatment of the theory of anarchism is from the journalistic point of view one of the stronger features of the U.L., it is by and large a dreary treatment; unaware of a century of critical thinking in politics and social theory which bears on classical anarchism, U.L.'s repetition of the magic formula of the sovereignty of the individual becomes tedious to the extreme. To those who are convinced of the permanence of folly, it is no surprise that, for example, there should be people who are still prepared to reduce their anarchism to the intellectual level of a politician's slogan —"let's have something constructive" by accepting the distinction between "the positive" and "the negative" (cf. editorial remarks in No. 1). But it is regrettable just the same that the expenditure of so much industry and effort on the part of the makers of the U.L. should produce little beyond the impression of chaos in their anarchy; that the elementary insight which, as would be expected, is absent from official English academic thought on social matters should also be absent from an anarchist movement.

The picture is dim, but not unrelieved; there are faint traces within some of the articles, of a conception of anarchism intellectually less confused, more critical and more objective than the anarchist-individualism which emerges from the bulk of the U.L. Thus Geoffrey Ostergaard, in his review article of de Jouvenel's "Sovereignty" (No. 5), hints at "questions which suggest themselves to anyone prepared to accept a broader definition of politics than the traditional one," questions the answers to which might both illuminate and modify anarchist theories. In parts of his otherwise grossly individualistic statement ("About Anarchism," No. 4), Ostergaard reveals an understanding of libertarianism which differs from run of the mill accounts: "The task of the anarchist is not, however, to dream about the future society; rather it is to act as anarchistically as he can within the present society . . ." Similarly, Colin Ward's implied insistence ("The New Blasphemy," No. 4) on the distinctness of anarchism from other forms of dissatisfaction (e.g., from ". . . Socialist Humanism, which is a sort of Marxist M.R.A. . . .") paves the way, if one has the wit to follow, for a realistic appreciation of anarchism.

But these are flashes in the pan compared with the farrago of inconsistent, metaphysical and oversimplified material about "the individual." Such stuff is congenial to the sentimental prejudices of humanists comforting their man-centred view of the universe while giving a run only to **some** of the things anarchists traditionally want to say. One ironical result of the U.L., then, is the highlighting of those parts of anarchism which fit in with social theories of solace and consolation and which for this very reason, have to be rejected. Such rejection is a condition of the emergence of a realistic conception of libertarianism, that is, of the adoption of a social theory not of harmony and comfort, but of permanent struggle—of critical evaluation of all that exists without fear of consequences.

GEORGE MOLNAR.

The Libertarian Society holds meetings every Thursday at 1 p.m. during term at the University of Sydney. Copies of "Libertarian," No. 1, price 2/- (containing articles on "Anarchism," "The Illusions of Moralism," "The Ideology of Chastity") available from R. Smilde, c/o 18 Manson Rd., Strathfield, N.S.W.